15.Abstract:
Operational level leaders are faced with the challenge of how to effectively deal with a wide array of new technology. Nowhere is this felt more than in the realm of information technology. Rapid advances in this field have led advocates to tout information technology as the panacea to many problems. This "revolution in military affairs" that this new technology promises has critical implications for today's operational commander. This paper examines the several challenges that senior military leaders will be forced to address as technology becomes an ever increasing part of the united States' defense structure. The "tools" needed by the operational commander to tackle these challenges are available and are embedded in an enduring set of leadership functions. A model is presented that attempts to encompass these major operational leadership functions and provide a logical and systematic approach for the senior military leader. The model focuses on a process examining the following functions: develop a vision, gather information, analyze the situation, decide on a course of action, plan and allocate resources, communicate, implement and evaluate results. This paper emphasizes these timeless set of leadership functions and an historical figure (British Field Marshall Sir William Slim) is used to highlight their enduring relevance. Gen. George S. Patton
Operational Leadership Challenges
Military officers today, especially those at the senior level of command, are faced with a diverse spectrum of challenges in this era of fast paced technology and high tempo operations.
Much has been written regarding the potential impact of the exponential increase of technology on the modern battlefield. This "revolution in military affairs" that new technology promises has critical implications for today's operational commander. This paper examines the several challenges that senior military leaders will be forced to address as technology becomes a more influential component of our national defense structure. The senior military commander's ability to meet these new challenges will be largely dependent upon his success at performing a timeless set of leadership functions. The leadership functions of the operational level commander will be examined and an historical figure (British Field Marshall Sir William Slim) will be used to highlight their enduring relevance. A model illustrating these operational leadership functions is also developed and presented.
Technology and the Operational Commander
The fact that most military officers, regardless of their specialty, have to deal with a myriad of advanced technical systems on a daily basis is undeniable. Nowhere is this more evident than in the realm of information technology. leaders are already deluged with vast quantities of information from innumerable sources. The staffs of senior officers are taxed to their limit to filter this avalanche of data in order to provide their commander with meaningful information. There appears to be a current mindset that more information is better, but the reality is that only relevant information is better. The senior officer is challenged to develop an efficient "information filtering system" to ensure that he only deals with pertinent facts. This flood of information into the senior level headquarters will likely increase with technological advances. The effectiveness of the commander's "filtering system" will also have to correspondingly improve.
In the near term, this information filtering system will continue to require human beings to make value judgments regarding the relevance of information received. Since staff sizes are unlikely to significantly increase to handle this function, the operational commander must develop a means by which manageable quantities of information are received at his headquarters. This will require the commander to increasingly empower his subordinate unit commanders to make decisions regarding the relevance of information before it is passed to the operational commander's headquarters. However, the senior commander will still be guidance regarding the specific type of information desired. Developing an effective information filtering network now is important to the senior military leader, but it will become absolutely critical to his success in the future.
A direct consequence of this "technology revolution" is that a senior commander may be lured into "waiting just a while longer" for more information from his advanced sensor systems before making a key decision. Proponents of these technologies suggest that the inherent uncertainty of battle maybe largely eliminated in the near future: "Technology could enable U.S.
military forces in the future to lift the 'fog of war'...dominate battle space awareness -the ability to see and understand everything on the battlefield -might be possible." 3 Although Admiral
Owens is clearly referring to some point in the future, information systems have already become so advanced that this has become an important issue for today's commander. The senior military leader rarely knows everything he wants to know, especially during combat operations.
Advanced information gathering capabilities may reduce the "fog of war," but it is extremely doubtful that it will ever be entirely eliminated. The operational leader will continue to have to make critical decisions with incomplete information. Often what is needed by the senior commander is not more sensor information but better understanding of the political, economic and cultural factors that influence a situation in order to make a sound and timely decision.
Another issue that technology advocates tend not to emphasize is that no amount of what is in the mind of his opponent. Under "ideal" circumstances, these sophisticated sensors and integrated processor may provide the operational leader with an accurate picture of the enemy's order of battle and disposition. However, there are two significant challenges that these enhanced sensor and information gathering capabilities present to the operational commander:
1) An opponent familiar with U.S. ISR capabilities will likely attempt to deceive them using "low tech" and inexpensive methods. It is not unreasonable to expect an enemy to use his available resources to attempt to confuse our most advanced radar, photographic and thermal imaging systems. This is a potential enemy capability that the senior commander must keep in the forefront of his mind as he reviews ISR information. Validating this information through more traditional (but higher risk) methods such as SOF team reconnaissance may be the commander's only recourse.
2) Assuming an accurate and detailed picture of enemy forces is obtained through ISR sources, a commander may still err by confusing ease of counting with counting only those things which are meaningful. During Vietnam, "body count" of enemy dead combatants was used as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) to determine the war's progress. Senior officers and Department of Defense officials emphasized this body count MOE largely because it was relatively easy to tabulate rather than being a meaningful measure of the enemy's will to continue the war. Modern ISR capabilities now provide the operational level leader with a vast array of sensor capabilities, affording him an impressive quantity of detailed data (e.g. number of enemy vehicles destroyed, soldiers killed and amount of infrastructure damaged). All this near real time sensor information may tempt the commander to choose a MOE that is readily available and easily quantifiable, but which is totally inappropriate for the situation . Frequently, the most critical factors when attempting to discern an enemy's status are those intangible elements which cannot be directly measured by any ISR asset, e.g. morale and loyalty of the enemy's troops, ^^ intent of the commander or national resolve of the opponent's population. None of these crucial elements will show up on any satellite photo. This is not to infer that these ISR capabilities should not be used, but rather the senior commander should ensure that he is drawing the correct conclusions from them and validating their reliability from other sources whenever possible.
The final significant technology challenge facing the operational commander deals with the wide spread enthusiasm in some U. weather or a congested urban setting may significantly degrade the performance and usefulness of our best weapons systems and sensors. Surely an operational commander must expect that a savvy opponent will attempt to fully exploit his environment by taking advantage of a triple canopy jungle or a densely populated urban area to foil the U.S. technological edge. The challenge for the commander will be to fully and rapidly comprehend the circumstances under which our technology will provide important leverage and also to know when it will not.
Operational Leadership Functions

"Command is that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion by which you get men to do what you want them to do, even if they don't want to do it themselves. "
Regardless whether the revolution in military affairs ever reaches the full fruition that its proponents envision, the essential functions of the operational military leader will remain the same. Advances in technology offer today's senior commander many new tools to assist him in performing his duties, but in the end, his fundamental tasks have not (and will not) change.
The characteristics that made for a successful operational combat commander, decades or even centuries ago, remain virtually unchanged. Although many volumes have been written regarding leadership in general, the operational level commander faces unique leadership challenges.
However, the methods employed to effectively cope with these challenges are not unique to this When examining this model, it is useful to understand that although the functions appear to be sequential, the commander frequently performs two or more of these tasks simultaneously. The analysis must focus on identifying those factors of space, force and time which are most likely to influence his own options as well as his opponent's. The commander must rely on his education, training and experience to determine which of the factors and their innumerable subelements are most important at any given time. In the end, analysis of the situation depends upon the commander's best judgment regarding which factors should be considered most critical at a particular point in an operation. Extensive staff work, computer modeling and elaborate decision matrixes are only tools which may (or may not) assist the leader in understanding the situation.
Slim had this to say about a senior leader's judgment, "The commander who always "guesses right" doesn't really guess, it's a product of all those things, training, knowledge, observation and character" 1 ** Decide on a Course of Action: The most critical aspect of this function is for the operational leader to "decide when he must decide". Since it unlikely that any senior commander will ever have all the information he would ideally like to have before making an important decision, a leader must use his best judgment when in this process he has sufficient information, given the time available, that enables him to go forward with a decision. No current or even near term "system of systems," "dominant battle space awareness" or "information superiority" will alleviate the operational commander's responsibility from having to manage risk by dealing effectively with uncertainty. Slim realized the truth of this and captured its essence most succinctly when he stated, "The prime task of the commander is to make decisions." 1 ' ** Plan & Allocate Resources: At the higher levels of war, effective operational leadership involves centralized planning and decentralized execution. It is during this part of the process that the senior commander has the opportunity to translate his vision into concrete plans. As the commander develops his military plans in detail, he must consider not only the tenets of operational art and the principles of war but also how to apportion his finite resources. The astute commander realizes that the resources available to him constitute far more than mere numbers of troops, armaments or supplies. Although these elements are important, it is often the "intangible resources" that determine the outcome of battles. These intangible resources of one's own forces that an operational commander would do well to always consider include morale, motivation, level of training, discipline, experience and ability of key combat leaders. Slim devoted considerable effort to developing these abstract qualities within his army and then shrewdly allocated these assets in his plans so as to ensure maximum combat efficiency. He realized that just as the material assets available to him were limited, so too were these intangible resources which he carefully husbanded. developing and motivating his subordinates. It is the "bedrock" upon which the entire operational leadership process rests. A prime responsibility of a senior commander is to not only provide direction to his organization, but also to ensure his troops have the necessary "tools" to carry out the commander's plans. These tools go beyond the standard material requirements of an army to encompass ensuring one's forces are adequately trained for the planned campaign. Slim recognized early the value of hard and realistic training when preparing for his offensive in Burma. His insistence on continuous and demanding jungle warfare training resulted in greatly improved fighting efficiency, improved morale and decreased casualties. Slim was also able to develop in his men, often by personal example, many of the superb leadership traits he so adeptly practiced. In this manner, Slim was a master not only of the operational leadership functions but also of training, developing and motivating his subordinates to accomplish the most demanding missions.
•
Conclusion
"The little affair of operational command is something anybody can do "
Adolf Hitler
As with many other things, Hitler could not have been more wrong when he underestimated the challenges arising from operational leadership. Today's military officers who hold senior command positions face many problems that threaten their ability to successfully carry out their responsibilities. Impressive technological advancements have been made that some advocates advertise as a panacea to these problems. The rapid growth of information technology is often touted as having the most significant potential to assist a commander in "lifting the fog of war."
However, with the promise of "total battle space awareness" comes a series of challenges that current operational leaders must be prepared to address. Commanders must ensure this information technology does not consume an inordinate amount of their time as it becomes more readily available in ever increasing quantities. Nor should commanders let this technology lure them into unwisely delaying making critical decisions in the vain hope that "perfect" information will become available. Most importantly, commanders must understand that future enemies may attempt asymmetric responses to thwart the U.S. technological edge. A commander who is unable to effectively deal with these challenges that technology poses will ultimately fail. However, the "tools" for an operational leader to succeed are available and are embedded in an enduring set of leadership functions. operational leadership functions and provide a logical approach to assist the commander in tackling these challenges. However, it is important to emphasize that this model only recommends a process by which a commander can apply a systematic methodology to leadership at the operational level. The success of operational leaders depends on their innate ability to apply their experience, training and judgment to effectively perform the leadership functions described in the model. The application of these leadership functions has been (and will continue to be) more of an "art" than a "science".
